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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Choses in action, employed in business transactions within a state, acquire
a taxable situs in that state.7 The rational seems to be that it is property
used within the state for the purpose of obtaining profit from its use and,
therefore, it is of that kind of property that should contribute to the sup-
port of the protecting state. The maxim, mobilia, sequuntur personam was
said to be at most a legal fiction "its proper operation being to prevent a
mischief, or remedy an inconvenience that might result from the general
rule of law."8
The application of the "business situs" doctrine to circumstances as those
which existed in the instant case seems justifiable. The centralization of
business management in a state clearly takes the ease out of the operation
of the maxim since no element of hardship is present. N. C. '37.
TAXATION-STOCK DIvEND AS INCOME.-The petitioner in 1924 and 1926
purchased preferred stock in a corporation whose articles of incorporation
provided that holders of preferred stock should receive annual dividends of
seven dollars a share in cash or, at the option of the corporation, one share
of common stock for each share of preferred. The preferred stock was re-
deemable at $105 per share plus accrued dividends; and upon dissolution or
liquidation was entitled to preferential payment of $100 a share plus ac-
crued dividend and no more: The common stock was entitled in such event
to the assets of the company remaining after payment of the preferred.
The company for the period of 1925 to 1928 inclusive, elected to pay the
preferred dividends in common stock. The point at issue was whether under
the Revenue Act of 1926 and 1928 one who purchases cumulative, non-vot-
ing, preferred shares of a corporation upon which a dividend is subse-
quently paid in common shares must, upon a sale or other disposition of
the preferred shares, apportion their cost between the preferred and com-
mon for the purpose of determining gain or loss. In computing the profit
realized by the petitioner the Commissioner allocated to the common stock
so received, in each instance, a proportionate amount of the cost of the pre-
ferred thereby decreasing the resulting cost basis per share and increasing
the income. On appeal: Held, that the dividends were not stock dividends
within the terms of the statute. Koshland v. Helvering, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.,
This decision is clearly in line with the previous cases of Eiser v. Ma-
comber,2 and Peabody v. Esner.3 The effect of all the cases is that a stock
dividend distributed to classes of shareholders who have pre-emptive rights
to the stock issue in which the "dividend" is paid is not taxable. Eisner v.
Macomber decided that such a dividend is not income within the meaning of
the Sixteenth Amendment. The instant case decided that only such stock
7 New Orleans v. Stempel (1899) 175 U. S. 309.
8 Ibid, at p. 314 of 175 U. S.
1 (May 18, 1936), 3 U. S. Law Week 942; Revenue Act of 1928, sec. 115 (f),
c. 852, 45 Stat. 791, 822; Revenue Act of 1926, sec. 201 (f), c. 27, 44 Stat.
9, 11: A stock dividend shall not be subject to tax."
2 (1919), 252 U. S. 189.
& (1917), 247 U. S. 347.
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dividend came within the scope of the Revenue Acts, that otherwise the
tax would be on capital and not income as authorized by the Sixteenth
Amendment.
"In Eisner v. Macomber, it was decided that a dividend in the corpora-
tion's common stock paid to the then common stockholders was not income
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and therefore the effort
to tax such dividends exceeded the power granted by the Amendment.
"It was said that such a dividend was not income because, by its pay-
ment, no severance of corporate assets was accomplished and the pre-exist-
ing proportionate interests of the stockholders remained unaltered." 4
In Peabody v. Eisner, the Supreme Court held taxable a dividend on the
stock of the Union Pacific Railroad paid in the stock of the Baltimore and
Ohio. Such a dividend "is to be governed for all purposes by the same rule
applicable to the distribution of a like value in money." That result was
clearly dictated by the decision in Eisner v. Macomber.
In construing Eisner v. Macomber, the Circuit Court of Appeals, in Com-
missioner v. Tillotson Mfg. Co.,5 said, "Two tests were thus established for
distinguishing a taxable from a non-taxable dividend in stock: (1) Sever-
ance of assets from the corporation, and (2) Alteration of the pre-existing
proportionate interest of the stockholders." By virture of that interpreta-
tion, the Court held taxable unissued common -stock issued as dividends to
preferred stock holders. And the Board of Tax Appeals, in following the
Tillotson Case, has held that a dividend in preferred stock paid to common
stockholders was not a stock dividend.6
Speaking of the Revenue Act of 1921, which contained the same provi-
sion about stock dividends, the opinion in the instant case said, "Soon after
the passage of that Act, this court pointed out the distinction between a
stock dividend which worked no change in the corporate entity, the same
interest in the same corporation being represented after the distribution by
more shares of precisely the same character, and such a dividend where
there had either been changes of corporate identity or a change in the na-
ture of shares issued as dividends whereby the proportional interest of the
stockholder after the distribution was essentially different from his former
interest."7
This language definitely makes the preservation of the corporate entity
and the proportionate interests of the shareholders the criteria on which
these decisions are based. Since these cases fall clearly into one category or
the other in that matter, little difficulty has arisen in applying that test,
but in future cases it is probable that the courts will directly consult the
regular doctrines of corporation law in regard to pre-emptive rights of
-stockholders in deciding whether a stock dividend represents income or
capital. W. H. M. '36.
4 Koshland v. Helvering, note 1.
5 (1935) 76 F. (2d) 189.
6 James H. Torrens (1934) 31 B. T. A. 787.
7 The Court cited: U. S. v. Phellis (1921) 257 U. S. 156, Rockefeller v.
U. S. (1921) 257 U. S. 176, Cullinan v. Walker (1922) 262 U. S. 134, Marr
v. U. S. (1924) 268 U. S. 536, all cases involving the re-organization of
corporations.
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